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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Alesha Ann Green appealed from the Judgment dismissing her Amended
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, asserting the district court erred when it addressed
the potential conflict of interest in her case because it did not adequately inquire into
whether the circumstances demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice.
Ms. Green’s trial counsel in the underlying criminal case and her post-conviction
counsel worked for the same public defender’s office, and Ms. Green’s post-conviction
petition raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims against trial counsel. The district
court recognized there was a potential conflict of interest, but it did not adequately
inquire into whether the circumstances of Ms. Green’s case demonstrated a significant
likelihood of prejudice.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued Ms. Green “has not shown that the
district court failed to make an adequate inquiry into whether [Ms.] Green’s postconviction counsel had a conflict of interest[].” (Resp. Br., p.7.) This Reply Brief is
necessary to show the district court did not adequately inquire into whether the
circumstances of Ms. Green’s case demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Ms. Green’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it addressed the potential conflict of interest in
Ms. Green’s case, because it did not adequately inquire into whether the circumstances
demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Addressed The Potential Conflict Of Interest In
Ms. Green’s Case, Because It Did Not Adequately Inquire Into Whether The
Circumstances Demonstrated A Significant Likelihood Of Prejudice
A.

Introduction
Ms. Green asserts the district court erred when it addressed the potential conflict

of interest in her case because it did not adequately inquire into whether the
circumstances demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice.

The district court

recognized there was a potential conflict of interest because Ms. Green’s trial counsel
and post-conviction counsel both worked for the same office and Ms. Green’s petition
raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims against trial counsel.

However, the

district court did not adequately inquire into whether the circumstances demonstrated a
significant likelihood of prejudice, because it did not ask post-conviction counsel
questions such as whether his office had set up effective measures to prevent
communication of confidential client information between lawyers employed on behalf of
individual defendants.
B.

The District Court Did Not Adequately Inquire Into Whether The Circumstances
Of Ms. Green’s Case Demonstrated A Significant Likelihood Of Prejudice
Ms. Green asserts the district court erred when it addressed the potential conflict

of interest in her case. The State argues the district court’s sua sponte inquiry was
more than adequate to protect Ms. Green’s nonexistent right to conflict-free counsel on
post-conviction.

(Resp. Br., p.3.)

However, the district court did not conduct an

adequate inquiry.
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As a preliminary matter, the State appears to have misunderstood Ms. Green’s
assertions on appeal. Ms. Green has not argued “that appointing the public defender’s
office in post-conviction proceedings automatically triggers some duty to inquire about
potential conflicts in every case where a separate public defender served as trial
counsel.” (See Resp. Br., p.7.) The potential conflict of interest arises here from the
facts that Ms. Green’s post-conviction petition raised ineffective assistance of counsel
claims against trial counsel, and post-conviction counsel worked for the same office as
trial counsel. (See R., pp.5-6, 23, 49.) Because of that potential conflict of interest in
this particular case, the district court should have conducted an adequate inquiry into
whether the circumstances demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice.
The State also argues Ms. Green has contended “she has some amorphous due
process right that requires the court to inquire into conflicts.” (Resp. Br., p.5.) While
Ms. Green has noted the Idaho Court of Appeals has held a post-conviction petitioner
has an interest in securing assistance to adequately present his claims for purposes of
procedural due process (App. Br., p.8 (quoting Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 342
(Ct. App. 2007)), she asserts on appeal a district court should inquire into potential
conflicts of interest in post-conviction matters “by analogy to the constitutional standard,
and to preserve the petitioner’s opportunity to work with post-conviction counsel.” (App.
Br., p.9.)
Under the statutory standard for the appointment of post-conviction counsel, if a
petitioner alleges facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court should
appoint counsel to give the petitioner an opportunity to work with counsel and “properly
allege the necessary supporting facts.” See Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792
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(2004).

The statutory opportunity to work with counsel would be hollow if post-

conviction counsel with a conflict were allowed to stay on a petitioner’s case.

Cf.

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012).
To present a claim of ineffective assistance at trial in accordance with the
State’s procedures . . . a prisoner likely needs an effective attorney. . . . A
prisoner’s inability to present a claim of trial error is of particular concern
when the claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel. The right to the
effective assistance of counsel is a bedrock principle in our justice system.
The State is correct that the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694 (2009), because this is a case involving
representation of the same client by two attorneys at the same office, rather than
representation of different clients. (See Resp. Br., pp.6-7.) However, it does not follow
that an inquiry into whether the office in this case set up effective measures to prevent
communication of confidential client information between lawyers employed on behalf of
individual defendants is, as the State suggests (see Resp. Br., pp.6-7), irrelevant.
Because trial counsel and post-conviction counsel both represented Ms. Green as
employees of the same office, and Ms. Green raised ineffective assistance of counsel
claims against trial counsel, this case presents a classic conflict. See Adams v. State,
380 So. 2d 421, 422 (Fla. 1980) (per curiam) (“The public defender . . . would be faced
with the dilemma of vigorously asserting the petitioner’s claim or defending the
professional reputation of his office. This would be at least as great a conflict as having
the same office represent two defendants with conflicting interests . . . .”)
Further, the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct do not indicate that the
principles governing conflicts of interest in concurrent representation are inapplicable to
potential conflicts of interest like the one at issue here. See Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.7
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& 1.10. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if “there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more client will be materially limited . . . by the personal
interests of the lawyer . . . .” Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(a)(2). A public defender’s
concurrent conflict of interest may be imputed to his or her entire office on a case-bycase basis.

See Severson, 147 Idaho at 706; cf. Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.10(a)

(containing the general rule, not applicable here, that a lawyer’s concurrent conflicts of
interest are necessarily imputed to his or her entire firm).
Contrary to the State’s argument, the principles governing conflicts of interest in
concurrent representation apply to potential conflicts of interest like the one at issue
here.

For example, Ms. Green would submit that comment 10 to Idaho Rule of

Professional Conduct 1.7, with its statement that “if the probity of a lawyer’s own
conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the
lawyer to give a client detached advice,” would apply to instances where two attorneys
from the same office represented the same client and the first attorney’s conflict was
imputed to the entire office. See Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.7 cmt. 10 & 1.10(a)(1); see
also Keats v. State, 115 P.3d 1110 (Wyo. 2005) (“There is . . . some indication that it is
not appropriate or expected for one to raise one’s own ineffectiveness. We too have
identified that such a practice is questionable.” (citations omitted)).
Such considerations would likewise apply where a public defender’s conflict was
imputed to his or her entire office on a case-by-case basis. See Severson, 147 Idaho at
706; see also Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1173 (10th Cir. 2004) (“If a criminal
defendant is represented by trial and appellate counsel from the same office, appellate
counsel’s assessment of trial counsel’s performance may be less than completely
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objective.

An understandable, although inappropriate, regard for collegiality may

restrain appellate counsel from identifying and arguing trial attorney-error.”).

Thus,

faced with a potential conflict of interest such as the one in this case, a district court
should conduct an adequate inquiry into whether the circumstances demonstrated a
significant likelihood of prejudice.
The State further contends the district court’s superficial inquiry here was
adequate because the district court “discover[ed] that there was in fact no conflict of
interest.” (See Resp. Br., pp.5-6.) But the district court’s inquiry failed to show there
was no conflict of interest.
The district courts questioned whether the case was not sent out for conflict
counsel because post-conviction counsel had not been the trial attorney, and postconviction counsels answered, “That’s what my boss tells me, Your Honor,” (Tr., p.8,
Ls.9-14), did not resolve whether there was a conflict. That part of the inquiry did not
demonstrate post-conviction counsel had been effectively “firewalled” or prevented from
communicating with trial counsel regarding confidential client information.
Severson, 147 Idaho at 707.

See

Nor did it dispel any possible concerns about post-

conviction counsel harboring an interest in not having another attorney from his office
be found ineffective. See Cannon, 383 F.3d at 1173 (“Arguing ineffective assistance
with respect to a colleague’s performance is saying that the performance was not only
inferior, but unreasonable. . . . Presenting an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
may well damage the reputation of the trial attorney and the office for which both trial
and appellate counsel work.”).
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Post-conviction counsel’s affirmative response to the district court’s question on
whether he had discussed with Ms. Green that he was representing her as a member of
the Ada County Public Defender’s Office (Tr., p.8, Ls.17-22), also did not resolve
whether there was a conflict.

The answer to that question did not indicate that

Ms. Green had waived the potential conflict of interest by giving her “informed consent,
confirmed in writing.” See Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(b)(4) & 1.10(c). The district
court’s superficial inquiry did not lead it to discover there was no conflict of interest.
Despite the State’s arguments, the district court did not adequately inquire into
whether the circumstances here demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice.
Thus, the district court erred when it addressed the potential conflict of interest in
Ms. Green’s case.

The judgment dismissing Ms. Green’s amended post-conviction

petition should be vacated and the matter should be remanded to the district court for a
proper conflict determination.

If the district court determines there is a conflict of

interest imputed to post-conviction counsel, Ms. Green should receive conflict-free
counsel to preserve her opportunity to work with counsel and properly allege the
necessary supporting facts for her post-conviction claims. See Charboneau, 140 Idaho
at 793.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Ms. Green respectfully requests this Court vacate the judgment dismissing her
amended post-conviction petition and remand her case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 24th day of May, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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